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Abstract: We study a non-cooperative game with aggregative structure, namely when the payoffs
depend on the strategies of the opponent players through an aggregator function. We assume that
a subset of players behave as leaders in a Stackelberg model. The leaders, as well the followers,
act non-cooperatively between themselves and solve a Nash equilibrium problem. We assume an
exogenous uncertainty affecting the aggregator and we obtain existence results for the stochastic
resulting game. Some examples are illustrated.
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1. Introduction
The well known Nash equilibrium concept is a solution concept used in a non-cooperative
situation where all the players act simultaneously, optimizing their own payoff taking into account
the decisions of the opponents. There is also the possibility that players do not act simultaneously:
for example, in the classical Stackelberg leader–follower model, a player called the leader acts first,
anticipating the strategy of the opponent, known as the follower, who reacts optimally to the leader’s
decision. In this case, the leader’s optimization problem contains a nested optimization task that
corresponds to the follower’s optimization problem.
In the case of multiple players, more than two, it is possible to have a hierarchy between two
groups of players: a group, acting as a leader, decides first and the other group reacts to the leaders’
decision. Now, it is necessary to determine the behavior between each group. In several applications,
players at the same hierarchical level decide in a non-cooperative way: each player in the group knows
that any other group member optimizes his own payoff taking into account the behavior of the rest.
Thus, a Nash equilibrium problem is solved within each group and a Stackelberg model is assumed
between the two groups. This leads to the multi-leader multi-follower equilibrium concept that we are
going to analyze in this paper.
In literature, this model appeared in the context of oligopolistic markets (see [1]) with one leader
firm and several follower firms acting as Cournot competitors. Other applications can be found,
for example, in transportation (see [2]), in the analysis of deregulated electricity markets (see [3]),
in water management systems (see [4]), and in wireless networks (see [5] ). See [6] for a survey on
the topic.
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As it happens in concrete situations, some uncertainty may appear in the data and a stochastic
model can be formulated. Usually, a random variable may affect the payoffs, and then one can
consider the expected payoffs with respect to its probability distribution. Then, the players optimize
the expected payoffs according the considered solution concept. De Miguel and Xu (see [7] ) extend
the multiple-leader Stackelberg–Nash–Cournot model studied in [1] to the stochastic case assuming
uncertainty in the demand function: leaders choose their supply levels first, knowing the demand
function only in distribution and followers make their decisions after observing the leader supply
levels and the realized demand function.
In this paper, we generalize the multi-leader multi-follower equilibrium concept for the class of
aggregative games (see [8–10]), namely games where each player’s payoff depends on his own actions
and an aggregate of the actions of all the players. Many common games in industrial organization,
public economics and macroeconomics are aggregative games.
The concept of aggregative games goes back to Selten ([11]) who considers as aggregation
function the summation of players’ strategies. Later, this concept has been studied in the case of
other aggregation functions, and it has been generalized to the concept of quasi-aggregative games
(see [7–10,12]). Computational results for the class of aggregative games have been also investigated
(see, for example, [13,14]).
We present the multi-leader multi-follower equilibrium model under uncertainty, assuming
an exogenous uncertainty affecting the aggregator, and some existence results for the stochastic
resulting game are obtained in the smooth case of nice aggregative games, where payoff functions
are continuous and concave in own strategies, as well as in the general case of aggregative games
with strategic substitutes. Applicative examples, such as the global emission game and the teamwork
project game, are illustrated.
We point out that our results hold for the general class of aggregative games and generalize the
ones obtained by De Miguel and Xu (see [7]) and by Nakamura (see [15]) for the Cournot oligopoly
games. Moreover, we briefly discuss the experimental evaluation based on the Sample Average
Approximation (SAA) method (see [16]) for the global emission game.
After the introduction, some preliminaries are recalled in Section 2. The model is presented in
Section 3, then studied in the smooth case in Section 4 and in the strategic substitutes case in Section 5,
providing existence theorems and examples. Some concluding remarks are in Section 6.
2. Preliminaries
Let us consider a parametric non-cooperative game in normal form Γt = 〈I , (Si,pii)i∈I , t〉 where
• I = {1, . . . , I} is the finite set of players (I ∈ N is a natural number);
• for any i ∈ I , Si ⊆ RN is the finite-dimensional strategy set and pii : S × T → R the payoff
function of player i;
• t ∈ T ⊆ RM a vector of exogenous parameters.
We denote by S = ∏Ii=1 Si and S−i = ∏j 6=i Sj, i ∈ I , and we recall some definitions that are useful
for a better understanding of this paper.
Definition 1. The game Γt = 〈I , (Si,pii)i∈I , t〉 is called aggregative if there exists a continuous and additively
separable function g : S → R (the aggregator) and functions Πi : Si × R× T → R (the reduced payoff
functions) such that for each player i ∈ I :
pii(si, s−i, t) = Πi(si, g(s), t)
for si ∈ Si, for all s ∈ S and for all t ∈ T (see [8,12,17]).
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Recall that a function g : S → R is additively separable if there exist strictly increasing functions
H : R→ R and h1, . . . hI : Si → R such that g(s) = H
(
∑i∈I hi(si)
)
for all s ∈ S (see [18]).
Let us suppose Si equipped with a partial order ≥ that is transitive, reflexive and antisymmetric1
(see [19]). Given S′i ⊂ Si, s ∈ Si is called an upper bound for S′i if s ≥ x for all x ∈ S′i ; s is called the
supremum of S′i (denoted by sup(S
′
i)) if for all upper bounds s of S
′
i , s ≥ s. Lower bounds and infimums
are defined analogously. A point x is a maximal element of Si if there is no y ∈ Si such that y > x
(that is, no y such that y ≥ x but not x ≥ y); it is the largest element of Si if x ≥ y for all y ∈ Si. Minimal
and smallest elements are defined similarly. A set may have many maximal and minimal elements,
but it can have at most one largest and one smallest element.
The set Si is a lattice if s, s′ ∈ Si implies s∧ s′, s∨ s′ ∈ Si, where s∧ s′ and s∨ s′ denote, respectively,
the infimum and supremum of s and s′. The lattice is complete if for all nonempty subsets S′i ⊂ Si,
in f (S′i) ∈ Si and sup(S′i) ∈ Si.
The real line (with the usual order) is a lattice and any compact subset of it is, in fact, a complete
lattice, as in any set in Rn formed as the product of n compact sets (with the product order).
A sublattice S′i of a lattice Si is a subset of Si that is closed under ∨ and ∧. A complete sublattice S′i
is a sublattice such that the infimum and supremum of every subset of S′i is in S
′
i .
A function pii : Si × S−i × T → R is supermodular in si if for all fixed (s−i, t) ∈ S−i × T ,
pii(si ∨ s′i, s−i, t)− pii(si, s−i, t) ≥ pii(s′i, s−i, t)− pii(si ∧ s′i, s−i, t)
for all si, s′i ∈ Si.
Supermodularity represents the economic notion of complementary inputs. The theory of
supermodular optimization has been developed by Topkis (see [20,21]), Vives (see [10,22]) and by
Granot and Veinott (see [23]). The following result is a characterization of supermodularity for twice
continuously differentiable functions with Euclidean domains. The standard order on such domains is
the so-called“product order” i.e., x ≤ y if and only if xi ≤ yi for all i.
Topkis’s Characterization Theorem Let I = [s, s] be an interval in Rn. Suppose that pi : Rn → R is twice
continuously differentiable on some open set containing I. Then, pi is supermodular on I if and only if for all
s ∈ I and all i 6= j, ∂2pi/∂si∂sj ≥ 0.
A function pii : Si × S−i × T → R exhibits decreasing differences in si and s−i if for all t ∈ T and
s′i > si the function pii(s
′
i, s−i, t)− pii(si, s−i, t) is non-increasing in s−i.
We deal in the following with parametric aggregative games
Γt = 〈I , (Si,Πi)i∈I , g, t〉
where g is the aggregator that is additively separable and Πi(si, g(s), t) are real valued functions
defined on Si ×R× T for any i ∈ I , which are the reduced payoffs.
Given these notions, it is useful to recall two existence results obtained by Acemoglu and Jensen
(see [12]).
In order to give the first result, let us introduce the following definition:
Definition 2. An aggregative game Γt = 〈I , (Si,Πi)i∈I , g, t〉 is said to be a nice aggregative game for any
t ∈ T if:
• the aggregator g is twice continuously differentiable;
1 Recall that transitive means that x ≥ y and y ≥ z implies x ≥ z; reflexive means that x ≥ x; antisymmetric means that x ≥ y
and y ≥ x implies x = y.
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• each strategy set Si is compact and convex, and every payoff function pi(s, t) = Πi(si, g(s), t) is twice
continuously differentiable and pseudo-concave in the player’s own strategies2;
• for each player, the first-order conditions hold whenever a boundary strategy is a best response, i.e.,
DsiΠi(si, g(s), t) = 0 whenever si ∈ ∂Si and (v− si)T DsiΠi(si, g(s), t) ≤ 0 for all v ∈ Si.
Thus, under convexity assumptions, the following holds:
Theorem 1. Let Γt = 〈I , (Si,Πi)i∈I , g, t〉 be a nice aggregative game for any t ∈ T . Then, there exists an
equilibrium s∗(t) ∈ S and also the smallest and largest equilibrium aggregates Q∗(t) and Q∗(t)3. Moreover,
Q∗ : T → R is a lower semi-continuous function and Q∗ : T → R is an upper semi-continuous function.
The second useful result is another existence result, obtained without any assumption of convexity,
but with assumption of supermodularity and decreasing differences.
Definition 3. The game Γt = 〈I , (Si,Πi)i∈I , g, t〉 is an aggregative game with strategic substitutes for any
t ∈ T if it is aggregative, strategy sets are lattices and each player’s payoff function pii(si, s−i, t) is supermodular,
is si, and exhibits decreasing differences in si and s−i.
Theorem 2. Let Γt = 〈I , (Si,Πi)i∈I , g, t〉 be an aggregative game with strategic substitutes for any t ∈ T .
Then, there exists an equilibrium s∗(t) ∈ S and also the smallest and largest equilibrium aggregates Q∗(t)
and Q∗(t). Moreover, Q∗ : T → R is a lower semi-continuous function and Q∗ : T → R is an upper
semi-continuous function.
3. The Model
We consider a parametric M + N-player game where M players (leaders) have the leadership
in the decision process: they commit a strategy knowing the best reply response of other N
players (followers) who are involved in a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium problem. Here,
M, N ∈ N0 = {0, 1, 2, . . . }; if M or N is equal to zero, the game turns out to be a non-cooperative Nash
equilibrium problem.
We consider an aggregative structure and let
〈
M + N, (Ui)Mi=1, (Vj)
N
j=1, (li)
M
i=1, ( f j)
N
j=1, g, t
〉
be the
normal form of the game where, for every i ∈ {1, . . . , M}, the finite-dimensional strategy set of leader
i is denoted by Ui ⊆ R+, and, for every j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, the finite-dimensional strategy set of follower j
is denoted by Vj ⊆ R+. Let us denote by U = ∏Mi=1 Ui and V = ∏Nj=1 Vj.
We assume an aggregative structure, i.e., there exists an aggregator function g : U ×V → R that
is additively separable:
g(x, y) = H
( M
∑
i=1
xi +
N
∑
j=1
yj
)
= H(X +Y),
where x = (x1, . . . , xM) with xi ∈ Ui, ∀i = 1, . . . , M and y = (y1, . . . , yN) with yj ∈ Vj, ∀j = 1, . . . , N
and H : R→ R is a strictly increasing function.
In order to introduce the payoff functions for both leaders and followers, that in our model are
profits, let us suppose that there is a shock in the game that hits the payoff functions.
2 A differentiable function pii(si , s−i , t) is pseudo-concave in si if for all si , s′i ∈ Si
(s′i − si)T Dsipii(si , s−i , t) ≤ 0⇒ pii(s′i , s−i , t) ≤ pii(si , s−i , t),
(see [24]).
3 Whenever s∗(t) is an equilibrium, Q(t) := g(s∗(t)) is called an equilibrium aggregate given t. Furthermore, if smallest and
largest equilibrium aggregates exist, these are denoted by Q∗(t) and Q∗(t).
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Since the M leaders must make a decision at the present time on their future strategies, they must
decide their strategies before the shock is realized, while the N followers can wait for choosing their
strategies and so they can first observe the strategies chosen by the M leaders and the realization of
the shock.
Let us represent this shock by a continuous random variable ξ : Ω→ R, where Ω is the set of all
possible events. Of course, we obtain a different payoff for every realization of the random variable ξ,
and, thus, by the distribution of ξ, we can characterize the uncertainty in the payoff functions.
The jth follower chooses his strategy after observing the realization of the shock and the strategies
chosen by all the leaders and he will keep the aggregate quantity of the leaders and the quantity of the
other followers fixed. Thus, denoting by T the set of all possibile realizations of the random variable
and by f j : Vj ×R× T → R his payoff function, for all (x, y) ∈ U ×V
f j(yj, g(x, y), t) = f j(yj, H(X +Y), t),
gives the profit he receives when t is the realization of the random variable. For a fixed x ∈ U and
t ∈ T , the followers solve a Nash equilibrium problem:
maxyj∈Vj f j(yj, H(X + yj +Y−j), t) (1)
for any j = 1, . . . , N, where Y−j = ∑k 6=j yk and X = ∑Mi=1 xi is the aggregate leaders’ committed strategy.
The ith leader chooses his strategy knowing the payoff function only in distribution since the shock
ξ(ω) is not realized yet: for all (x, y) ∈ U×V, his profit is given by the function li : Ui×R× ξ(Ω)→ R
defined as
li(xi, g(x, y), ξ(ω)) = li(xi, H(X +Y), ξ(ω)).
Moreover, since he acts simultaneously with all other leaders, he must take into account that
the strategies of other leaders, x−i ∈ U−i = ∏k 6=i Uk, are fixed and, since he acts before every
follower, he must also consider the reaction of the followers to the aggregate leaders’ strategy that
is a solution to problem (1), i.e., y1(H(X, ξ(ω))), . . . , yN(H(X, ξ(ω))). Then, if Y(H(X, ξ(ω))) =
∑Nj=1 yj(H(X, ξ(ω))), any leader considers the expectation with respect to ξ(ω) of his profit li(xi, H(X+
Y(H(X, ξ(ω)))), ξ(ω)) and solves the problem:
maxxi∈UiE[li(xi, H(xi + X−i +Y(H(xi + X−i, ξ(ω)))), ξ(ω))], (2)
where X−i = ∑k 6=i xk.
In the following, U, V are assumed to be compact and each f j : Vj × R× T → R is assumed
to be upper semi-continuous on Vj × R × T and continuous in R × T , and analogously each li :
Ui ×R× ξ(Ω) → R is assumed to be upper semi-continuous on Ui ×R× ξ(Ω) and continuous in
R× ξ(Ω).
Suppose now that the followers’ problem (1) has a unique solution.
Definition 4. A multi-leader multi-follower equilibrium with aggregate uncertainty (MLMFA equilibrium) is
an M + N-tuple
(x?1 , . . . , x
?
M, y1(H(X
?, ·)), . . . , yN(H(X?, ·))),
such that
E[li(x?i , H(X
? +Y(H(X?, ξ(ω)))), ξ(ω))] = (3)
maxxi∈UiE[li(xi, H(xi + X
?
−i +Y(H(xi + X
?
−i, ξ(ω)))), ξ(ω))]
for any i = 1, . . . , M, where
yj(H(X?, t)) ∈ argmaxyj∈Vj f j(yj, H(X? + yj +Y−j(H(X?, t))), t) (4)
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for any j = 1, . . . , N and (y1(H(X?, t)), . . . , yN(H(X?, t))) is the Nash equilibrium among followers given
the aggregate leaders’ strategy and the realized shock ξ(ω) = t ∀t ∈ T .
The given definition generalizes to aggregative games the multiple-leader Stackelberg equilibrium
given by De Miguel and Xu in the case of a Nash–Cournot oligopoly game (see [7]).
If ξ(ω) is a continuous random variable, we suppose that it has density function ρ(t) with T
supporting set, and we can rewrite the leaders’ payoff functions in the following way:
E[li(xi, H(X +Y(H(X, ξ(ω)))), ξ(ω)) = (5)∫
T
li(xi, H(xi + X−i +Y(H(xi + X−i, t))), t)ρ(t)dt
for any i = 1, . . . , M and for t ∈ T .
If ξ : Ω→ R is a discrete random variable i.e., ξ(Ω) is finite or countable, ξ(Ω) = {t1, . . . , th, . . . },
the leaders’ payoff functions are defined by
E[li(xi, H(X +Y(H(X, ξ(ω)))), ξ(ω)) = (6)
∑
h
li(xi, H(xi + X−i +Y(H(xi + X−i, th))), th)p(th)
for i = 1, . . . , M, where p(th) = P(ξ(ω) = th) i.e the probability that the realization of the random
variable is th, for any h ∈ N.
Remark 1. In the deterministic case, when M = N = 1, the model corresponds to the classical Stackelberg
Leader–Follower problem (see [25]). The case M = 1 and N ≥ 1 has been introduced in the oligopolistic market
context in [1,26] and studied from a computational point of view in [27], where it has been called MPEC, and it
has been applied in other several contexts, for example in transportation in [2].
4. The Regular Case
In order to prove the existence and uniqueness of the follower Nash equilibrium and the existence
of a multi-leader multi-follower equilibrium with aggregate uncertainty, we will use the following
assumptions, already presented in literature (see [12,28]).
Assumption 1. The aggregative game
〈
M + N, (Ui)Mi=1, (Vj)
N
j=1, (li)
M
i=1, ( f j)
N
j=1, g, t
〉
is an aggregative nice
game for every t ∈ T i.e.,
• the aggregator g is twice continuously differentiable;
• every strategy set Ui and Vj for i = 1, . . . , M and j = 1, . . . , N is compact and convex;
• the payoff functions li(xi, g(x, y), t) and f j(yj, g(x, y), t) are twice continuously differentiable and
pseudo-concave in the player’s own strategy for all i = 1, . . . , M and for all j = 1, . . . , N;
• Dxi li(xi, g(x, y), t) = 0 whenever xi ∈ ∂Ui and (v − xi)Dxi li(xi, g(x, y), t) ≤ 0 ∀v ∈ Ui and
Dyj f j(yj, g(x, y), t) = 0 whenever yj ∈ ∂Vj and (u − yj)Dyj f j(yj, g(x, y), t) ≤ 0 ∀u ∈ Vj for all
i = 1, . . . , M and for all j = 1, . . . , N (that means that the first-order conditions hold whenever a best
response is on the boundary).
Remark 2. By using these assumptions on li, for all i = 1, . . . , M, and the theorem of differentiation under the
integral sign, it also follows that the expected payoff functions E[li(xi, H(X +Y(H(X, ξ(ω)))), ξ(ω)) satisfy
the Assumption 1 for any i = 1, . . . , M.
Now let us give another assumption on the followers’ side.
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Let us introduce for any t ∈ T and j = 1, . . . , N the marginal profit that we can denote by
pij(yj, H(X +Y), t) := D1 f j(yj, H(X +Y), t) + D2 f j(yj, H(X +Y), t)
∂H
∂yj
(X +Y),
where D1 f j =
∂ f j
∂yj
and D2 f j =
∂ f j
∂H .
Assumption 2. If (yj, H(X +Y)) satisfies yj < H(X +Y) and the marginal profit pij(yj, H(X +Y), t) = 0,
then
(i)
∂pij
∂yj
< 0,
where
∂pij
∂yj
= D11 f j(yj, H(X + Y), t) + 2D12 f j(yj, H(X + Y), t) ∂H∂yj (X + Y) + D22 f j(yj, H(X +
Y), t) ∂H∂yj (X +Y) + D2 f j(yj, H(X +Y), t)
∂2 H
∂y2j
(X +Y);
(ii) yj
∂pij
∂yj
+ H(X +Y)
∂pij
∂H < 0.
Note that (i) corresponds to the law of diminishing marginal utility, while (ii) is assumed in
order to obtain that the share functions are strictly decreasing and so to ensure the uniqueness of the
followers’ Nash equilibrium (see [28]).
Example 1. (see [7]). An oligopolistic situation with M + N firms that supply an homogeneous product
noncooperatively is given. M leader firms announce their quantities in U1, . . . UM and the rest of the N firms
react by choosing a Cournot–Nash equilibrium in V1, . . . , VN . We consider:
• Ui and Vj for all i = 1, . . . , M and for all j = 1, . . . , N are compact subsets of R+ 4;
• the aggregator is the sum of the strategies i.e., g(x, y) = X +Y;
• given an exogenous random variable ξ(ω), the payoff function for every leader i is
E[li(xi, X +Y(X, ξ(ω)), ξ(ω)) =∫
T
xi p(xi + X−i +Y(xi + X−i, t), t)ρ(t)dt− Ci(xi),
where p is the inverse demand function that depends on the aggregate quantity and the random variable
ξ(ω) and Ci is the ith leader’s cost function, with p and Ci for all i = 1, . . . , M being twice continuously
differentiable functions;
• the payoff function for every follower j is
f j(yj, X +Y, t) = yj p(X + yj +Y−j, t)− cj(yj),
where cj is the jth follower’s cost function, that is twice continuously differentiable, and t is the realization
of the random variable.
Remark 3. Note that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold for Example 1.
4.1. Existence of an MLMFA Equilibrium
In this section, based on the results obtained by Acemoglu and Jensen in [12] and by Cornes
and Hartley in [28], we give theorems that prove first of all the existence and uniqueness of the
4 Ui and Vj are subsets of R+ with capacity limits.
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followers’ Nash equilibrium and then the existence of a multi-leader multi-follower equilibrium with
aggregative uncertainty.
Fixing x = (x1, . . . , xM), for any t ∈ T , we consider the reduced aggregative game〈
N, (Vj, f j)Nj=1, g, t
〉
.
Theorem 3. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the following hold:
(i) there exists an equilibrium (y1(H(X, t)), . . . , yN(H(X, t))) ∈ V i.e., this N-tuple satisfies (4) with
X = ∑Mi=1 xi;
(ii) denoted by Q(x, t) = g(x, y1(H(X, t)), . . . , yN(H(X, t))), which is called an equilibrium aggregate
given t and given x, there exist the smallest and largest equilibrium aggregates with respect to t, while x is
fixed, denoted by Q∗(x, t) and Q∗(x, t), respectively;
(iii) Q∗ : U × T → R is a lower semi-continuous function ∀x and Q∗ : U × T → R is an upper
semi-continuous function ∀x;
(iv) the equilibrium (y1(H(X, t)), . . . , yN(H(X, t))) is unique.
Proof. The result (i) is obtained easily, applying Kakutani’s fixed point theorem. In fact, the best-reply
correspondences will be upper hemi-continuous and have convex values, since by Assumption 1 f j
∀j = 1, . . . , N are quasi-concave functions (because pseudo-concavity implies quasi-concavity).
Points (ii) and (iii) follow straightforwardly from Theorem 1.
Point (iv) follows from Cornes–Hartley (see [28]) because of Assumption 2.
Remark 4. By points (ii) and (iv), it follows that Q∗(x, t) = Q∗(x, t) = Q(x, t) and so, by point (iii), we can
conclude that the function Q : U × T → R is a continuous function.
Theorem 4. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, there exists an MLMFA equilibrium.
Proof. The existence follows from Theorem 3, Remark 2 and Theorem 1.
Example 2. (Global Emission Game)
Let us consider the game 〈
4, (Ui, li)2i=1, (Vj, f j)
4
j=3, g, t
〉
,
where, fixing smax > 0, Ui = [0, smax] for i = 1, 2, Vj = [0, smax] for j = 3, 4 and, denoted by s = (s1, s2, s3, s4)
the vector of strategies, g(s) =
(
∑4h=1 sh
)2
. Assume a random variable ξ(ω) with uniform distribution
ρ(t) = 1T ∀t ∈ [0, T] (T > 0). Let’s consider α,β > 0. Then,
• for any t ∈ [0, T], the payoff functions for the followers are
f j(sj, g(s), t) = αsj −
s2j
2
− β
2
(s1 + s2 + s3 + s4 + t)2
for j = 3, 4;
• the payoff functions for the leaders are
E[li(si, g(s), ξ(ω))] = αsi −
s2i
2
− β
2
∫ T
0
[
(s1 + s2 + s3 + s4 + t)2
] 1
T
dt
for i = 1, 2.
Fixing (s1, s2) and t, the followers choose the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium
s3(s1, s2) = s4(s1, s2) =
α− β(s1 + s2 + t)
1+ 2β
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with α ≥ β(2smax + T). Thus, the leaders maximize, with respect their own strategy, the following
payoff function:
E[li(si, g(s), ξ(ω))] = αsi −
s2i
2
− β
2
∫ T
0
[( s1 + s2 + 2α+ t
1+ 2β
)2] 1
T
dt,
and the MLMFA equilibrium is
(s∗1 , s
∗
2 , s
∗
3 , s
∗
4) =
=
(2α(1+ 2β)2 − β(4α+ T)
2[(1+ 2β)2 + 2β]
,
2α(1+ 2β)2 − β(4α+ T)
2[(1+ 2β)2 + 2β]
,
(1+ 2β)2(α− βt− 2αβ) + 2β(α− βt + 2αβ) + β2T
[(1+ 2β)2 + 2β](1+ 2β)
,
(1+ 2β)2(α− βt− 2αβ) + 2β(α− βt + 2αβ) + β2T
[(1+ 2β)2 + 2β](1+ 2β)
)
,
∀t ∈ [0, T], ∀β > 0 and ∀α ≥ β(2smax + T).
This model corresponds to a global emission game in the context of an IEA (International Environmental
Agreement) under the Stackelberg assumption (see [29,30]), where leaders are signatory countries and followers
are non-signatory countries, in a non cooperative strategic game, and strategies describe their emission levels.
Note that Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied for this game and Theorems 3 and 4 hold.
4.2. An Illustrative Computational Evaluation
A classical algorithm to solve stochastic optimization problems is the Sample Average
Approximations method (SAA) (see, for example, [16]). The reason why this algorithm is really
useful is that this method, rather than using the distribution of the random variable ξ(ω), uses only a
sample of ξ(ω). Thus, the idea is to approximate the expected value function by the sample average
of the random function and then to give convergence results that guarantee the convergence of the
solutions of the SAA problem as the sample size increases.
The SAA method has been used for Cournot oligopoly games (see [7]). As an illustrative example,
we apply this method to the Global Emission Game of Example 2.
Let ξ1, . . . , ξk be an independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random sample of k
realizations of the random variable ξ(ω). We approximate the ith leader’s decision problem by
the following SAA problem:
maxxi∈Uiφ
k
i (xi, X−i) :=
1
k
k
∑
h=1
li(x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xM, ξh),
where, for simplicity, we denote li(x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xM, ξh) = li(xi, H(xi + X−i +Y(H(X, ξh))), ξh).
If (xk1, . . . , x
k
M) satisfies φ
k
i (x
k
i , X
k
−i) = maxxi∈Uiφ
k
i (xi, X
k
−i) for i = 1, . . . , M, then
(xk1, . . . , x
k
M) is called a multi-leader multi-follower equilibrium with aggregate uncertainty of the SAA problem
(MLMFA-SAA equilibrium).
If we introduce the function
L(x, z, ξh) :=
M
∑
i=1
li(x1, . . . , zi, . . . , xM, ξh)
and the function
φk(x, z) :=
1
k
k
∑
h=1
L(x, z, ξh),
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then xk = (xk1, . . . , x
k
M) is an MLMFA-SAA equilibrium if and only if
φk(xk, xk) = maxz∈Uφk(xk, z).
Note that if we consider L(x, z, ξ(ω)) := ∑Mi=1 li(x1, . . . , zi, . . . , xM, ξ(ω)) and φ(x, z) :=
E(L(x, z, ξ(ω)), it is straightforward to see that the vector x∗ = (x∗1 , . . . , x∗M) is an MLMFA equilibrium
if and only if
φ(x∗, x∗) = maxz∈Uφ(x∗, z).
Let us consider the case of Global Emission Games (Example 2). We have that
l1(z1, x2, ξ(ω)) = αz1 −
z21
2
− β
2
( z1 + x2 + 2α+ ξ(ω)
1+ 2β
)2
and
l2(x1, z2, ξ(ω)) = αz2 − z
2
2
2
− β
2
( x1 + z2 + 2α+ ξ(ω)
1+ 2β
)2
and so
L(x, z, ξ(ω) = α(z1 + z2)−
(z21 + z
2
2)
2
− β
2
( z1 + x2 + 2α+ ξ(ω)
1+ 2β
)2 − β
2
( x1 + z2 + 2α+ ξ(ω)
1+ 2β
)2
.
With the method proposed above, for a fixed k, we can compute an MLMFA-SAA equilibrium,
maximizing over z ∈ U the function φk(xk, z):
xk = (xk1, x
k
2) =
( α(1+ 2β)2
(1+ 2β)2 + 2β
− 2αβ
(1+ 2β)2 + 2β
− β∑
k
h=1 ξ
h
k[(1+ 2β)2 + 2β]
,
α(1+ 2β)2
(1+ 2β)2 + 2β
− 2αβ
(1+ 2β)2 + 2β
− β∑
k
h=1 ξ
h
k[(1+ 2β)2 + 2β]
)
.
In order to investigate the convergence of a sequence of MLMFA-SAA equilibria for k→ +∞, let
us note that L(x, z, ξ(ω)) is a Lipschitz continuous function. Thus, in this case, we can easily obtain
that φk(x, z) converges to φ(x, z) uniformly and, with a probability of one, the sequence {xk} converges
to the unique MLMFA equilibrium x∗.
5. A More General Case in an Optimistic View
In the previous sections, we have considered that the payoff functions are twice continuously
differentiable; in this section, we want to avoid this assumption, and, in order to obtain results on the
existence of an MLMFA equilibrium in this more general framework, we need an assumption taken
from Acemoglu and Jensen ([12]).
Assumption 3. The aggregative game
〈
M + N, (Ui)Mi=1, (Vj)
N
j=1, (li)
M
i=1, ( f j)
N
j=1, g, t
〉
is an aggregative
game with strategic substitutes for any t ∈ T , i.e.,
• every strategy set Ui and Vj for i = 1, . . . , M and j = 1, . . . , N is a lattice;
• for all i = 1, . . . , M and for all j = 1, . . . , N the payoff functions li(xi, g(x, y), t) and f j(yj, g(x, y), t) are
supermodular in the player’s own strategy and exhibit decreasing differences in xi and X−i and in yj and
Y−j, respectively, for any t ∈ T .
For any x = (x1, . . . , xM) and for any t ∈ T , we consider the reduced aggregative game〈
N, (Vj, f j)Nj=1, g, t
〉
.
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Theorem 5. Under Assumption 3, the following hold:
(i) there exists an equilibrium (y1(H(X, t)), . . . , yN(H(X, t))) ∈ V i.e., this N-tuple satisfies (4);
(ii) there exist the smallest and largest equilibrium aggregates denoted by Q∗(x, t) and Q∗(x, t), respectively;
(iii) Q∗ : U × T → R is a lower semi-continuous function and Q∗ : U × T → R is an upper
semi-continuous function.
Proof. This result is an immediate consequence of Theorem 2.
This theorem gives us the existence of a Nash equilibrium among followers but not the uniqueness
of it. Thus, in principle, there are multiple equilibria denoted by NE(X, t). We can consider a selection
of the correspondence (X, t)⇒ NE(X, t), namely, a function
λ : (X, t)→ (yλ1 (H(X, t)), . . . , yλN(H(X, t))),
in order to choose a profile in the set of the possible Nash equilibria of the followers.
We suppose that li(xi, g(x, y), t) = li(xi, H(X +Y), t) is increasing in the second variable i.e., the
aggregator g. Since H is a strictly increasing function, li(xi, H(X +Y), t) is increasing in the aggregate
of strategies. By Theorem 5, the equilibria aggregates are ordered from the smallest one to the largest
one and we assume that the leaders adopt the max-selection (in line with [31]) i.e.,
(ymax1 (H(X, t)), . . . , y
max
N (H(X, t))),
such that ∑Nj=1 y
max
j (H(X, t)) = Y
∗(x, t), and they take into account the following functions:
li(xi, g(x, Y∗(x, t)), t) = li(xi, H(X +Y∗(x, t)), t),
and they solve a Nash equilibrium problem.
Remark 5. By integral’s monotonicity and by Assumption 3, the function E[li(xi, H(X + Y∗(x, t)), t)] is
supermodular in the player’s own strategy and exhibits decreasing differences in xi and X−i, for all i = 1, . . . , M
and for any t ∈ T .
Remark 6. In the case of multiple followers’ responses, the max-selection corresponds (for M = 1) to the
so-called strong Stackelberg–Nash solution or optimistic Stackelberg–Nash solution (see [32–35]).
Theorem 6. If Assumption 3 holds and if li(xi, g(x, y), t) is an increasing function in the aggregator, then
there exists an MLMFA equilibrium.
Proof. Since Assumption 3 holds, then Theorem 5 holds, and, since li(xi, g(x, y), t) is an increasing
function in the aggregator, using the max-selection, we can consider the reduced aggregative game〈
M, (Ui, li)Mi=1, g, t
〉
, where li = li(xi, H(X +Y∗(x, t)), t) ∀i = 1, . . . , M, which is an aggregative game
with strategic substitutes. Considering the functions E[li(xi, H(X +Y∗(x, t)), t)], for any i = 1, . . . , M,
by Remark 5 and using Theorem 2, the result is proved.
Example 3. (Teamwork Project)
Let us consider the game 〈
3, (U1, l1), (Vj, f j)3j=2, g, t
〉
,
where U1 = [0, 1], Vj = [0, 1] for j = 2, 3, and, denoted by s = (s1, s2, s3), the vector of strategies,
g(s) = ∏3h=1 sh. Assume a random variable ξ(ω) with uniform distribution ρ(t) = 1 ∀t ∈ [0, 1]. Then,
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• for any t ∈ [0, 1], the payoff functions for the followers are
f j(sj, g(s), t) = (s1s2s3)1+t
for j = 2, 3;
• the payoff function for the leader is
E[l1(s1, g(s), ξ(ω))] = E
[
(s1s2s3)1+ξ(ω) −
(
s1 +
1
4
)4]
=
∫ 1
0
(s1s2s3)1+tdt−
(
s1 +
1
4
)4
.
Fixing s1 and t, the followers’ Nash equilibria are
NE(s1, t) =
{
{(0, 0), (1, 1)} i f s1 6= 0,
[0, 1]2 i f s1 = 0.
By using the max-selection, the leader considers (s∗2 , s∗3) = (1, 1) and so he maximizes, with respect to his
own strategy, the following payoff function:
E
[
s1+ξ(ω)1 −
(
s1 +
1
4
)4]
=
∫ 1
0
s1+t1 dt−
(
s1 +
1
4
)4
=
s1(s1 − 1)
logs1
−
(
s1 +
1
4
)4
.
It can be proved that there exists sM ∈ [0, 1] where this function has a positive maximum.
This model corresponds to the Teamwork project with multiple task (see [9,36]).
Note that Assumption 3 is satisfied in this game, and, since l1 is an increasing function in the
aggregator g(s) = ∏3h=1 sh, Theorems 5 and 6 hold.
6. Conclusions
We have studied a non-cooperative aggregative game, with M players acting as leaders and
N players acting as followers in a hierarchical model, and we have assumed that there is an
exogenous uncertainty that affects the aggregator. We have proved an existence result in the case of
followers’ Nash equilibrium uniqueness as well as an existence result in the case of non-uniqueness,
using the max-selection.
A further possible direction of research could be investigating the existence of MLMFA equilibria
in the case of non uniqueness of the followers’ reactions, in order to adopt other selections (see [37]).
Moreover, in order to obtain existence results in more general settings, it would be interesting to
consider a broader class of aggregative games (see [9,17]).
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